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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Rule 
5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1986 as 
amended). Appellant petitioned this Court to permit an appeal from three interlocutory 
orders of the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, entered on October 22, 2007. The Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Orders was granted by this Court by Order entered November 30, 2007. R. 
287-88. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue # 1. Whether new authority from this Court required the district court to quash the 
bindover, and/or to permit a new preliminary hearing, to examine that the touching prong 
of forcible sexual abuse requires the touching of uncovered skin, particularly where here 
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the testimony did not reveal such touching, and that the alternative prong of indecent 
liberties was similarly elevated to a higher magnitude ot seventy. 
Standard of Review. 
A trial court's determination of the law is reviewed for "correctness." Application 
of .ac "correctness ^ijiuLiitl menus (lie appc Iliil1 ' nurt decides the matter for itself and 
n*M defer in am decree to the trial judge's ueiernimation of law. State v. Pena, 869 
*' -^ • •-. ^ • .iiiiiL Male v. UeiK ' * • i - ;-, (Utah WJ'JIK State V. 
os[k, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615. 
Issnt> i>: "u*or four felony counts, one occurring 16 months prior to the others, and 
where each occurred separate and independently from the others alleged to have occurred 
in factually distinct manners require severance f *« • l? 
a \ o* *>; i ! ' J10 avoid the prosecution's use of the cumulative 
nature of the allegations to attempt to obtain convictions. 
Standard of Review. 
. '. Tlir li i.il n null's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are accorded 
no deference by the reviewing court, State v. Pena, 869 : • \ 
( citing State v. Deli, 861 P.2d4319433 (Utah 1993)); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d ^ 4 . 
781-82 (Utah 1991); State v. Wanosik, 2001 I "I 
Issue # 3. Whether the District Attorney's prior business and poliliul IH-IMIHVJIIC W I I I I 
the accuse^ . . ; services I- In*1! .inJ her election bid during the 
a inn t y the position she now holds, and additionally where currently she serves on a 
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political steering committee with the accused, requires that her office be disqualified from 
the prosecution of the case. 
Standard of Review. 
The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are accorded 
no deference by the reviewing court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993)); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 (Utah 1991); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah Constitutions are presented 
for interpretation, and they provide: 
Amendment V of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 
[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 
Section 1. [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution [Due Process of Law] provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are contained in pertinent part in the text of this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l 
Rule 18, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 1.11, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rules 102 & 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
VS. I 
OZWALD BALFOUR, i 
Defendant and Appellant. i 
[ BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
; Case No. 20070902-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This case is an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted Mr. Balfour's Petition for 
Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Orders on November 30, 2007. R. 287-88. Mr. 
Balfour is charged by Amended Information of committing three separate offenses of 
Forcible Sexual Abuse, each a second degree felony, and one count of Attempted 
Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third degree felony. R. 27-30. 
B. Course of the proceedings. 
Following a bindover at the preliminary hearing held in this matter, Mr. Balfour 
filed motions in the district court challenging the bindover, requesting a severance of the 
four counts and moving to disqualify the District Attorney's office from prosecuting the 
case due to prior business and political relationships with Mr. Balfour. The case was 
initially assigned for trial to the Honorable Ann Boyden who heard the first two motions. 
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The case was subsequently reassigned to Judge Judith S. Atherton who, after reviewing 
the transcripts in the first two motions resolved the third motion and signed separate 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law denying all three motions. See Addendum A3 
B and C, respectively, for the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
denying: (A) the Motion to Quash the Bindover (R. 281-84); (B) the Motion to Sever the 
Counts (R. 275-80); and (C) the Motion to Disqualify the Office of the District Attorney 
(R. 273-74). 
C. Disposition at the trial court. 
As this is an appeal from interlocutory orders, no trial has occurred below. This 
appeal is from the denial of the three separate motions noted above in section B (Course 
of the Proceedings) which were filed, argued and denied in the district court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(This Statement of Facts contains a general overview of the 
facts; a more detailed discussion of the facts is contained 
within each point of the argument with citations to the record.) 
Mr. Ozwald Balfour was charged by Amended Information with three counts of 
Forcible Sexual Abuse, each a separate second degree felony, and one count of 
Attempted Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third degree felony. R. 27-30. Each count occurred 
with a different alleged victim and at different times from one another. One of the 
second degree felony counts was alleged to have occurred on a different date over sixteen 
months earlier in time and at that alleged victim's home. Id. The other three counts all 
allegedly occurred on the same date at two different locations and at different times with 
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different alleged victims and with different specifics allegations. See Copy of the 
Amended Information at Addendum D, and specifically the probable cause statement. 
At a preliminary hearing on the matter held in March of 2006, all four counts were 
bound-over as alleged. R. 60-61; R. 292 (the Preliminary Hearing transcript). The basis 
of the bindover regarding the three second degree felonies, given the brief argument 
presented at the end of the evidence, was the "touching" prong of the statute. Regarding 
the attempted charge, Count IV, a brief discussion took place regarding the indecent 
liberties prong of the charge. However, the prosecutor closed her comments with, "I 
think the court is entitled to look at the conduct that [the defendant] took with these other 
women [the three second degree counts]. There was touching of body parts that 
happened with these other women." R. 292 at 142. (emphasis added). Later the 
magistrate, again responding to an intent argument on Count IV, ruled, "[A]nd in the 
other cases there's at least evidence at this point of touching in places that would 
normally be considered to be sexual (inaudible)." R. 292 at 143 (emphasis added). 
Several months after the bindover, in August of that same year, this Court ruled in 
State v. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356, 144 P.3d 226, that "touches" as used in the touching 
prong of the forcible sexual abuse, requires the touching of uncovered skin. 
Mr. Balfour filed a Motion to Quash the Bindover of the four charges, to remand 
for a new preliminary hearing and to Dismiss Count IV, in large part due to the change 
and clarification of the statutory term "touches" as announced by this Court in Jacobs. R. 
130-38. Mr. Balfour highlighted in his motion the transcript sites which illustrated that 
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no skin to skin touching had occurred with any of the victims' testimony. R. 140-42. 
The court denied the motion ruling, inter alia, that the change in the law would not 
change the bindover order and that probable cause existed as the conduct met the other 
"indecent liberties" prong in that the conduct was of equal gravity to skin to skin 
touching. See Addendum A, at Conclusion of Law no. 3. 
Mr. Balfour also filed a motion to sever the four counts as alleged in the charges. 
R. 71-84. The trial court denied that motion finding that the four counts are properly 
joined because they are part of a common scheme or plan and that the evidence would be 
admissible in separate trials and no prejudice would occur by prosecuting the counts in a 
single trial. See Addendum B for Conclusions of Law. 
During this time in the proceedings, the case was reassigned from one judge to 
another within the Third District Court due to health reasons of the first judge. 
Differences between the parties' positions and conflicting interpretations of previous 
court orders created issues which remained unresolved and compounded by the 
reassignment to the new judge. Counsel for Mr. Balfour decided to follow his client's 
suggestion that he speak directly with the District Attorney about the needs of the case. 
In April of 2007, Defense counsel met with District Attorney Lohra Miller and the 
assigned prosecutor Alicia Cook. The purpose of the meeting was for counsel to seek a 
reduction of the charges or outright dismissal given the evidentiary issues following the 
preliminary hearing and the new Jacobs case. At that meeting the District Attorney, after 
considerable dialogue about the case, recalled the Defendant's name and made a 
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connection to a business entity that she used during her political campaign. Ms. Miller 
recalled the name of the company to have been OMNI Media, owned by Ozwald Balfour. 
Mr. Balfour also had been active in the Salt Lake County Republican Party and active in 
the election campaign of Ms. Miller. Ms. Miller indicated a nearly immediate reaction to 
remove herself from any further discussions about the case. 
Counsel for Mr. Balfour requested that Ms. Miller recuse/disqualify herself and 
her entire office from prosecuting the case, asking her to transfer the matter to another 
county. After attempts to resolve this issue were unsuccessfully negotiated (more 
specific facts to be detailed within the argument section of this issue itself), counsel filed 
a formal motion to disqualify with the trial court. R. 211-21; 248-59. The State opposed 
that motion insisting that Ms. Miller was removed from any involvement in the case. R. 
222-42. The court, after briefing and argument denied the motion concluding that the 
Defendant's contribution of media support and current involvement in the Republican 
Party serving with Ms. Miller did not create a conflict of interest requiring 
disqualification of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. R. 295 (Transcript of 
Hearing on the motion to disqualify); See Addendum C for copy of the court's order. 
Although the hearings on each of the three motions were held separately, all 
involved shared the understanding that the orders would be signed at the same time to 
facilitate that a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal would be prepared 
and filed with the Utah Court of Appeals. The orders denying each defendant request 
were signed on October 22, 2007; and based on stipulation of the parties and the prior 
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judge's approval the court authorized the petition for interlocutory appeal. The petition 
requesting permission to file for an interlocutory appeal subsequently was filed with this 
Court and the permission granted in November of 2007. R. 287-89. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court incorrectly applied a new decision of this Court in denying the 
Motion to Quash the Bindover. The State's evidence at the preliminary hearing failed to 
establish the necessary skin to skin contact or similarly elevated indecent liberties prong 
of the statute as required in this Court's opinion in State v. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356, 
144 P.3d 226. 
Similarly, the trial court incorrectly denied the Motion to Sever the Counts as 
charged in the Information. Appellant is charged with four counts of sexual assault 
which occurred at different times with different alleged victims. Appellant is entitled by 
statute and controlling authority to a severance of the charges and separate trials on each 
to avoid the prejudices inherent in combining the counts into a single trial. 
A prosecutor should be disqualified when the prosecutor has a personal 
conflicting interest in a case. The District Attorney's prior and current business and 
political relationship with the accused once raised at the pretrial stage merited a decision 
from the trial court to disqualify the District Attorney and her office from the 
prosecution. The trial court's decision to deny that request requires this Court to reverse 
that decision and order the disqualification. 
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ARGUMENT 
I ; N E W A U T H O R I T Y F R Q M T m s C Q X J R X REQUIRES THAT 
THE BINDOVER BE QUASHED AS THE E L E M E N T S OF THE 
OFFENSES W E R E N O T ESTABLISHED AS R E Q U I R E D BY THE 
NEW CONTROLLING CASE LAW. 
On August •» »o, after this case was heard at the Prelimina"^ I i 
essentia; c ^ m e m oi the crime of Forcible Sexual Abuse, is that the 
accused touch the bar.* , .^cr j .vd in the statute State v. 
Jacobs, 2006 UT Apr 356. ; M P . 3 d 2 2 6 . The Jacobs . r 
. pu: **. ...Uv; tux other prong of the statute, ihe "indecent liberties" 'vong, must 
support that the sexual mis'vmlui i W ol equal gra\ JI\ *x-. that of touching the bare skin. 
IdL at Tf 9. 
The magistrate at the Preliminary Hearing did not have the benefit of the g>. ui • . 
nf'ihi Jacobs" ni I liereloiu, as occurred in Jacobs itself, the magistrate applied an 
erroneous standard as to whether the State had me I HM In HI, I HI ol J HI nil as in the element 
of whether the defendant touched the bare skin of the victims or that he otk'rv^ 
engaged in H»\ nidi-ceiil liberties of equal gravity. 
At the Preliminary Hearing, i i i i l n MUM, Ii '.UMI ilie Nia . \mcc iwv.iis.il a ry 
e\ iuence that the defendant touched the skin of any proscribed part of the h •<-•• 
ii r, . ^ contrary inc icsliinony was very clear that no skin to skin 
touching had occurred. Dis.r i: * ••• - —sn i**. *^ at the 
Preliminary Hearing regarding Count III. Ms. Jensen testified that Mr 1 iiil u mi n n\ er 
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touched her breasts and never went under her blouse. R. 292 at 40-41. Ms. Jensen 
testified that Mr. Balfour dropped his pants and rubbed his penis against her shorts. R. 
292 at 20-23. However, this testimony was completely at odds with the report of her 
statement to the police where Ms. Jensen is reported as saying that "at no time did his 
clothes come off." See Sealed Addendum to Defendant's Motion to Sever, Supplemental 
Narrative, Officer S. Colunga; and R. 292 at 41-42. 
Rachael Olsen is the state witness who testified at the Preliminary Hearing 
regarding Count II of the Amended Information. Ms. Olsen testified that Mr. Balfour did 
a brief grab of her breast over her bra. R. 292 at 90-92, 97. 
Michelle Lawrence is the state witness who testified at the Preliminary Hearing 
regarding Count I of the Amended Information. Ms. Lawrence testified that in trying to 
lift her shirt, Mr. Balfour only may have touched her breast. R.292 at 62. Ms. Lawrence 
also testified that Mr. Balfour did a glancing touch across her breast. R. 292 at 61-62. In 
the police report it states that Ms. Lawrence informed the officer that Mr. Balfour 
grabbed her breast and buttocks over the clothing. In the transcript of an interview of 
Ms. Lawrence, she states that Mr. Balfour grabbed her hand and put it on his crotch. 
Police Interview Transcript at 8, 11. This is contradicted by Ms. Lawrence in her 
testimony at the Preliminary Hearing where she testified that the only time Mr. Balfour's 
hand touched her own was when she pushed his hands away from trying to lift her shirt. 
R. 292 at 70. 
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Rebecca Gibbons is the state's witness who testified at the Preliminary Hearing 
regarding Count IV of the Amended Information. Ms. Gibbons testified that Mr. Balfour 
attempted to unzip her coat and pull it back over her shoulders. R. 292 at 123. She 
further testified that Mr. Balfour did not reach for her breasts nor her buttocks and only 
touched her in an attempt to lift up her shirt. R. 292 at 123-25. When Ms. Gibbons 
resisted, Mr. Balfour stopped and backed off. R. 292 at 124-25. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the standard of proof required at 
preliminary hearing in State v. Talbot 972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998): 
In undertaking this review, we are mindful that "preliminary hearings are 
adversarial proceedings in which the prosecution must present sufficient evidence 
to establish that 'the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it.'" State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah 
R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2)). The "quantum of evidence" necessary does not have "to 
establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must [be] sufficient 
to warrant submission of the case to the trier fact." State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 
778,783 (Utah 1980). The prosecution, at a minimum, must establish "a prima 
facie case against the defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude the 
defendant was guilty of the offense as charged." 
Talbot, 972 P.3d at 438 (emphasis added). 
More recently, in State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300, the Court reviewed the 
conflicting standards that have been used to determine probable cause in the preliminary 
hearing. In Clark, the Court reiterated the long-standing rule on the magistrate's role in 
preliminary hearings: 
The magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not that of a rubber 
stamp for the prosecution.... Even with this limited role, the magistrate must 
attempt to ensure that all groundless and improvident prosecutions are ferreted out 
no later than the preliminary hearing. 
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Id. at 303 (internal citations omitted). 
The Clark Court went on to hold that, to bind a case over at preliminary hearing, 
the State must present some evidence of every element of the crime. The Court stated, 
"We hold that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must still produce 
"believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id. at 305 (quoting State 
v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521,524 (Utah 1983)). 
Although the Clark court held that quantum of evidence necessary to support a 
bindover is less than that required to survive a directed verdict, the State still must present 
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged. This requirement has been 
repeated often since Clark. See, e.g., State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, fflf 14-16, 26 P.3d 
223, 225-26. 
Thus, if the State fails to produce some believable evidence of even one of the 
elements of an offense at the preliminary hearing, the charge must be dismissed. See e.g. 
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725 (upholding magistrate's dismissal of drug 
distribution charge), cert, denied. 9 P.3d 170; State v. Fixmer, 2002 UT App 367 
(upholding magistrate's dismissal of methamphetamine lab and stolen vehicle charges); 
State v. Robinson, 2003 UT App 367, 63 P.3d 105 (affirming magistrate's dismissal of 
manslaughter charge). 
Inasmuch as the trial court did not apply the ruling of State v. Jacobs to the facts as 
presented at the Preliminary Hearing, the court erred. The State did not present 
sufficient evidence of a skin to skin touching or any similar indecent liberty of sufficient 
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gravity as a skin to skin touching and the bindover from the Preliminary Hearing should 
have been quashed by the district court. This Court should correct that error and order 
that the case be remanded with instructions to quash the bindover as requested by the 
Appellant. 
II: SEVERANCE OF THE COUNTS IS REQUIRED BY 
STATUTE AND CASE AUTHORITY WHERE THE 
ALLEGED OFFENSES OCCUR AT SEPARATE TIMES 
WITH SEPARATE ALLEGED VICTIMS. 
The matter before this Court involves four separate Counts, with four different 
alleged victims. The Amended Information filed against Mr. Balfour charges the 
defendant with three counts of Forcible Sexual Abuse, and one count of Attempted 
Forcible Sexual Abuse. See Addendum D. 
The first Count of Forcible Sexual Abuse stems from events which allegedly 
occurred on or about September 15 of 2003, in the home of the alleged victim. The 
remaining three Counts involve conduct which allegedly all occurred at the defendant's 
place of business on January 21, 2005. The conduct giving rise to each of the remaining 
counts allegedly occurred while the defendant was alone with each of the complaining 
witnesses at his place of business. Id. 
Count I alleges that the defendant touched the complaining witness' breasts, 
attempted to remove her shirt and placed her hand upon his crotch before she left. Count 
II alleges that the defendant touched the complaining witness' breasts and buttocks. 
Count III alleges that the defendant touched the complaining witness' breast beneath her 
shirt and put his hand down her pants. Count IV alleges that the defendant grabbed the 
complaining witness by the hips and attempted to pull up her shirt. Id. 
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Utah Statute governs when charges against a defendant may be joined and when 
charges shall be severed. The plain language of the code is clear and demonstrates why 
severance is appropriate in this matter. Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l provides: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same 
indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses 
charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(3)(a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be 
tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one, could 
have been joined in a single indictment or information. 
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder 
of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial 
together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, 
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l (emphasis added). 
Pursuant to the plain language of the above statute, a court is given discretion to 
authorize permissive joinder of charges only if certain requirements are met. Section 77-
8a-1(1) establishes that joinder may be allowed if (1) each offense is a separate count, (2) 
the offenses are based upon the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission, or (3) were alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. Here, 
the counts are designated separately, satisfying the threshold inquiry; however, both the 
second and third requirements are not met. The alleged offenses are not based upon the 
same conduct. The same alleged act did not give rise to all of the charges, but distinct 
alleged acts against different individuals form the basis for each independent count. 
Any similarity in alleged conduct or proximity with respect to time does not bring 
the acts within the ambit of the 'otherwise connected together' language of the statute, 
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but rather, creates a heightened degree of prejudice to the defendant should the matters be 
tried together, thus the second prong is not satisfied. The third requirement also fails, in 
that the offenses were not alleged to have been part of any common scheme or plan. The 
alleged offenses are forcible sexual abuse charges, crimes against distinct individuals 
with no connected criminal objective. Again, similarity in the alleged conduct and 
proximity in time do not convert distinct alleged acts against different individuals into 
offenses committed pursuant to a common scheme or plan, and the state has not alleged 
them as such. 
A related section of the Utah code, § 76-1-401. ("Single criminal episode" defined 
- Joinder of offenses and defendants), provides further guidance as to what constitutes 
conduct which should be consolidated into a single matter, it provides: 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an 
attempt or an accomplishment of & single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 77-
8a-1 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Accordingly, the offenses alleged here do not meet the requirements which give a 
court permissive authority to join offenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (emphasis added). 
The most logical interpretation based on the plain language of the statute again 
demonstrates that the requirements for joinder are not met in this case. Further, the 
United States Supreme Court has directed that "'ambiguity concerning the ambit of 
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.1" Simpson v. United States, 435 
U.S. 6, 14, 98 S.Ct. 909, 914 (1978) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 
92 S.Ct 515, 522 (1971)). Accord United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 n.10, 101 
S.Ct. 2524, 2531 n.10 (1981) (recognizing that the "rule of lenity," as a "guide to 
statutory construction . . . serves as an aid for resolving any ambiguity"). Thus, when 
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there are two potential readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to 
choose the harsher only when the Legislature has spoken in clear and definite language." 
Scheidlerv.NOW.Inc, 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 1068 (2003) (quoting McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987)). Accordingly, 
permissive joinder of the charges is not appropriate in this matter. 
Importantly, embodied within §77-8a-l along with the permissive discretion for 
joinder of charges is a compulsory restriction requiring severance. Section 77-8a-l(4)(a) 
requires severance upon a finding of prejudice were counts to be joined. Specifically, 
"[i]f the court finds a defendant... is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses . . . the court 
shall order an election of separate trials . . . " Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(4)(a)(emphasis 
added). The risk of prejudice to a defendant under this statute trumps the permissive 
ability of a court to join offenses, even should they satisfy all the requirements needed for 
joinder to be appropriate. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this principle and stated that a "[t]rial 
court has discretion to order separate proceedings for offenses arising from same criminal 
episode to promote justice and for good cause shown, such as where joinder would 
unduly prejudice defendant and jeopardize his or her right to due process. State v. 
Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1995). 
In the case against Mr. Balfour, as demonstrated above, the alleged offenses did 
not arise from the same act nor were they part of a single criminal episode or pursuant to 
a common criminal scheme or objective. The offenses are alleged sexual assaults against 
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four different individuals. There is an inherent prejudicial impact to the defendant should 
these offenses be tried in one proceeding; this prejudice clearly justifies and even requires 
the severance of these proceedings. 
The offenses are sexual assaults charged under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-404, and 
the testimony and evidence with respect to each count will be sensitive in nature and 
explicit. The allegations are brought on behalf of four different individuals, for the 
defendant's alleged behavior on four different occasions where he and each victim were 
alone together. Each count alleges a separate criminal act of sexual abuse against a 
different victim. Allowing these counts to be tried together effectively treats them all as 
one criminal act, and strips them of their independent nature. 
The Utah Supreme Court has considered a similar issue involving the prior statute 
authorizing joinder in the unique context of sexual offenses. See State v. Gotfrey, 598 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1978). The Court noted that the purpose of the joinder statute1 is "to 
allow joinder of offenses and thus eliminate multiple prosecutions in the interest of 
efficiency and economy of time and effort when the interests of justice can best be served 
thereby." Gotfrey, 598 P.2d at 1326. The Court then made the important qualification 
that follows: 
[C]are must be taken that the statute is not misused to deprive an accused of a fair 
trial upon an offense by joining different offenses so that evidence concerning 
charges unrelated in time and nature, which would normally not be admissible 
1
 §77-21-31 at the time Gotfrey was decided, which is a provision that was repealed and 
renumbered and currently still in effect in the code in substantially the same form and codified as 
§77-8a-l, the provision discussed herein. 
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upon a trial, could be admitted as to the multiple offenses in an effort to stigmatize 
the defendant and thus make it questionable that the jury would give a fair and 
dispassionate consideration to the evidence on the first charge. 
Id. In Gotfrey, the two charges of rape related to incidents several months apart and with 
different victims; and that the charge of sodomy was a separate and distinct offense with 
different elements and again a different victim. Id. The approach adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Gotfrey should be applied here. Otherwise, the defendant will be 
wrongfully stigmatized by the evidence of the multiple charges and will suffer inherent 
unjust prejudice. 
In Gotfrey the defendant was convicted of two counts of statutory rape involving 
two of his teenage step-daughters, and one count of forcible sodomy involving a step-son. 
The statutory rape charges stemmed from incidents in September of 1975 and March of 
1977, and both occurred in the family mobile home; the sodomy charge arose out of an 
incident in October of 1976, and took place on a camping trip. Id. The Supreme Court of 
Utah reversed the convictions commenting that although there was likely sufficient 
evidence to uphold them, the crimes were distinct and should not have been joined in one 
proceeding - the joining of the proceedings was improper and deprived the defendant of a 
fair trial. Id. 
Here, three of the four Counts allegedly took place at the defendant's place of 
business on January 21, 2005, and the remaining Count allegedly took place some sixteen 
months earlier. Each Count involves a different individual, and do not involve identical 
facts. Importantly, the offenses charged in this matter are all sexual abuse charges, just as 
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in Gotfrey, and should be severed due to their sensitive nature, differing facts and victims 
and danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Here, to ensure that the defendant is not 
unjustly deprived of a fair trial as was the defendant in Gotfrey, the Counts should be 
severed. 
Further, and contrary to the decision of the trial court, it is questionable whether 
the evidence of the individual counts could be introduced under evidence rule 404(b) at a 
trial on any of the other counts. While three of the Counts allegedly occurred on the 
same day in the same office, the incidents all took place separately, with the only 
witnesses to the incidents being each individually alleged victim and the defendant. 
Rule 404(b) requires that evidence of prior bad acts be offered for a proper purpose, and 
not used in order to prove character or action in conformity therewith. United States v. 
Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10 th Cir. 1994). In Mills, the court set forth a four part test in 
determining whether prior bad act evidence would be admissible: 
Defendants are protected against unfair prejudice from 404(b) 
evidence by: 1) Rule 404(b)'s requirement that the evidence be 
offered for a proper purpose; 2) Rule 402's relevancy 
requirement; 3) Rule 403's requirement that any potential for 
unfair prejudice from the introduction of the evidence be 
substantially outweighed by the probative value; and 4) a 
requirement that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the 
jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the 
purpose for which it was admitted. 
Id. at 1554 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 6911-922, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 
11502, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). This approach is applicable under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and within the context of this case. 
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This Court citing our Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Care must be taken that the statute [governing joinder of charges] is not 
misused to deprive an accused of a fair trial upon an offense by joining 
different offenses so that evidence concerning charges unrelated in time and 
nature, which would normally not be admissible upon a trial, could be admitted 
as to the multiple offenses in an effort to stigmatize the defendant and thus 
make it questionable that the jury would give a fair and dispassionate 
consideration to the evidence on the first charge. 
State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah App., 1990) (citing Gotfrev, 598 P.2d at 1328). 
In this case, defendant's conduct with any one alleged victim has little if any 
probative value to the consideration of his conduct with another. The charges relate 
to distinct incidents, where only the defendant and the alleged victim were present. 
What may or may not have happened while the defendant was alone with another 
individual should not be allowed to taint the jury's understanding of what occurred in 
any one given instance, but they should be allowed to weigh the evidence surrounding 
each individual instance independent of outside or cumulative evidence. Each count 
merits its own independent evaluation. The accumulative prejudice of the four counts 
joined together increases the risk of unfair prejudice. 
Rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence explains that the overriding purpose of 
the rules is "to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the 
end that truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." In an 
individual proceeding on any of the four counts, the Utah Rules of Evidence would 
disfavor the admission of evidence regarding the other counts, this serves as further 
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justification that the counts be severed. In sum, the interests of judicial economy do 
not outweigh the potential spill over effect and risk of unfair prejudice by allowing 
joinder of the four Counts. Defendant respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
trial court and order a severance of the counts and a separate proceeding for each. 
The notion that the evidence of all four counts together will not be treated in 
the aggregate is misguided. Each count should be allowed to be heard and weighed 
independently by a finder of fact without the cumulative impact inherent in trying 
four sexual assault cases at once. This is not a case where a number of offenses are 
based upon the defendant's conduct in one episode against one or even multiple 
victims, but involves four distinct episodes, four independent alleged victims. The 
defendant will be greatly prejudiced in that the evidence will be considered in the 
aggregate, the testimony of one alleged victim will supplement that of another, and 
the four counts will be wrongfully commingled and inappropriately considered, 
stripping the defendant of his fundamental rights. Considerations of due process 
require independent review should be afforded to each individual charge or the counts 
will be contaminated by the facts and circumstances of the other charges. 
Due to the extreme degree to which the defendant will be prejudiced should the 
counts be tried together, the defendant respectfully requests that this Court exercise its 
discretion under §77-8a-l, and grant his motion to sever the proceedings. 
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Ill: THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND HER OFFICE 
SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM PROSECUTING DUE 
TO THE PRIOR AND CURRENT BUSINESS AND 
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ACCUSED. 
As noted above, in April of 2007, counsel for Mr. Balfour, at the request of his 
client, met with District Attorney Lohra Miller and the assigned prosecutor Alicia Cook. 
The purpose of the meeting was for counsel to seek a reduction of the charges or outright 
dismissal given the evidentiary issues in the case and the new decision in Jacobs. At that 
meeting the District Attorney, after considerable dialogue about the case, recalled the 
Defendant's name and made a connection to a business entity that she used during her 
political campaign. Ms. Miller recalled the name of the company to have been OMNI 
Media, owned by Ozwald Balfour. Mr. Balfour also had been active in the Salt Lake 
County Republican Party active in the election campaign of Ms. Miller. Ms. Miller 
indicated a nearly immediate reaction to remove herself from any further discussions 
about the case. R. 295. 
Ozwald Balfour and his media consulting groups, OMNI Media and OZ Media, 
were active in the strategizing and providing advertising services and community 
outreach services to Lohra Miller's campaign for the job she now holds. Mr. Balfour 
contributed those services and media consulting assistance to her campaign and to the 
Salt Lake County Republican Party at no charge. It is believed that Ms. Miller listed 
those services as donations to both herself (her campaign) and the Salt Lake County 
Republican Party. Mr. Balfour is unsure of the amounts of the contributions, but 
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indicates they were significant. In addition, Mr. Balfour and the District Attorney 
currently sit on the same committee in the Republican Party. 
Counsel for Mr. Balfour became uncomfortable and requested that Ms. Miller 
recuse/disqualify her entire office from prosecuting the case, asking her to transfer the 
matter to another county. In a letter later sent to Ms. Miller counsel indicated his position 
as follows: 
Your response to remove only yourself from the case leaves us without an 
opportunity to discuss the matter with the lead and elected official ultimately 
responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases in the county. 
Your decision to recuse yourself, but not your office, due to the prior relationship 
disadvantages my client either by leaving him in the untenable position of not 
having the district attorney review and consider requests about the case, and/or 
additionally, that your prior relationship with Mr., Balfour might impact against 
an appropriate decision to dismiss or resolve the matter favorably for Mr. Balfour 
out of the fear of being accused of leniency toward someone who assisted in your 
campaign. 
Counsel then (at that meeting) indicated his intent to file a Motion to Disqualify the 
Office. He later, in that same letter referenced above, explained a change in that course 
and wrote the letter suggesting that rather than create a media concern, a preferred course 
would be to submit the issue to the State Bar's Ethics Advisory Committee for an 
advisory opinion. Counsel suggested that the parties could agree ahead of time to accept 
and be bound by that opinion. 
The letter was never answered by the District Attorney or her office. A follow up 
letter was sent two months later on July 25, 2007, noting numerous attempts to confer 
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with Ms. Miller without success and requesting her time to address the issue. 
Alternatively, counsel indicated his only other choice would be to file the Motion. 
Subsequent to the second letter, counsel did receive a telephone call from 
Assistant District Attorney Robert Stott who indicated that he would review any concerns 
about the case. Mr. Stott also indicated that the matter had been staffed and that the 
office would not recuse itself. Counsel asked about the offer to have the State Bar's 
Ethics Committee review the issue and Mr. Stott told him that he could not decide 
whether to do that and would have to speak directly with Ms. Miller. 
While no Utah case law governs the exact situation presented in this case, several 
analogous and helpful cases assist in resolving the conflict. For example, this Court has 
noted that conflicts of interest typically arise regarding prosecutors when a former 
defense attorney prosecutes his former client. State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, f 
18, 143 P.3d 302, 306, citing State v. Hursey, 176 Ariz. 330, 861 P.2d 615, 617-18 
(1993). Wareham was the reverse factual scenario to the typical situation; however, the 
this Court discussed general rules applicable here and quoted with approval the Arizona 
decision. 
The Hursey court noted that, in such circumstances, there is a substantial danger 
that confidential information revealed to counsel during the original attorney-
client relationship could be used against the client in the subsequent prosecution. 
The court concluded that prior representation of a criminal defendant precludes an 
attorney's subsequent prosecution of the same client: "4[W]e cannot say without 
speculation that the prosecutor's knowledge of those prior cases will not actually 
result in prejudice to defendant. The public trust in the integrity of the judicial 
process requires us to resolve any serious doubt in favor of disqualification" " 
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State v. Hursey, 176 Ariz. 330, 861 P.2d 615, 617-18 (1993)(citations omitted; emphasis 
added). 
The Wareham court did reverse the enhancement of the defendant's DUI 
specifically because the prior relationship provided a limited conflict regarding the prior 
relationship between the former prosecutor now defending Mr. Wareham. Wareham, 143 
P.3d at 307. Obviously, Mr. Balfour was never represented by the District Attorney and 
Wareham does not control. Nonetheless the concerns at issue in Wareham, determining 
the nature of any conflict and the position and or difficulties the current prosecution 
places on the former and current relationship are helpful. 
Again, Hursey, from Arizona, explains the appropriate considerations for this case 
at bar. 
Prior to the adoption of the current Rules of Professional Conduct (the Ethical 
Rules), the Code of Professional Responsibility governed attorney conduct. 
Canon 9 of the code stated that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of 
impropriety." Although the Ethical Rules do not retain the "appearance of 
impropriety" language found in Canon 9, the "appearance of impropriety ... still 
has a definite place in the balancing test the trial court must apply in resolving the 
question of disqualification." A prosecutor, who himself has a conflict, does not 
alleviate the "appearance of impropriety" by merely assigning part of the case to 
another prosecutor; he is still the prosecutor "handling" the case and "[pjublic 
confidence in the criminal justice system ... is eroded when a prosecutor has a 
conflict or personal interest in the criminal case which he is handling." We 
believe that to prevent the perception or actuality of a breach of confidentiality,... 
reversal is necessary in cases of this type.... [A] conviction must be reversed if the 
trial court denies a pretrial defense motion to disqualify a prosecutor who 
previously has defended the defendant in any criminal matter that involved or 
likely involved confidential communications with the same client. 
State v. Hursey, 176 Ariz. 330, 333-34, 861 P.2d 615, 618-19 (1993)(citations omitted). 
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This rationale from Hursey echoes the concerns of Mr. Balfour. The District Attorney is 
ultimately responsible for "handling" each and every case prosecuted in that office. In 
People v. Choi, 80 Cal.App.4th 476, 483 (Cal.App. 2000), the court disqualified the 
entire office noting that deputy district attorneys serve at the will of the District Attorney. 
The court observed that potential biases might result from the fact that deputies are hired, 
evaluated and promoted by the District Attorney and one cannot assume the deputies will 
not be influenced by the same considerations as those of the District Attorney. 
In reality, it is only under the authority of the District Attorney that the assigned 
deputy can "handle" the prosecution of a case. Factually, that vicarious "handling" is 
keenly observed in our case where another administrating attorney, apparently assigned 
to remove and screen the District Attorney from the case, either would not or could not 
decide a course to take without clearing the question with the District Attorney herself. 
This scenario demonstrates the principle cited above from the California case, effectively 
emphasizing that one cannot say that attempting to recuse only the district attorney will 
sanitize the conflict and permit the assumption that the deputy who prosecutes will not be 
influenced by the very considerations that barred the district attorney from participation 
in the case. See also, People v. Lepe, 164 Cal.App.3d 685, 689 (1985). 
Accordingly, Mr. Balfour urges recusal/disqualification of the entire office 
because of his concern and claim of harm that due to the District Attorney's removal of 
herself, though not her office, he might not receive appropriate review and consideration 
with the case where merited. He indicated the following to the trial court: 
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1. Abdicating her role as the elected official responsible to the public leaves him 
without the supervisory review of the elected individual directly responsible to 
the public for her actions; 
2. The assignment of Assistant Robert Stott to assume that role reveals the 
illusory nature of the assignment as he admitted that he necessarily would not 
or could not make a decision about the proposed resolution requested of 
counsel without first chatting with Ms. Miller herself; and 
3. Recent history has revealed that Ms. Miller has undergone scrutiny in her 
short administration to date with complaints about repaying favors to political 
supporters in dismissing a case such that her inclination to dismiss or 
otherwise resolve the case here is hampered by the existence of the 
relationship and her own history. Taking action in this case to either dismiss 
or resolve his case could increase the criticism and scrutiny of both Ms. Miller 
and her office, negatively impacting a decision against Mr. Balfour that 
otherwise would merit the attention and action requested. 
For example, early in her term of office Ms. Miller dismissed a case of Aggravated 
Assault filed against a police officer who was specifically accused of shooting an 
unarmed suspect. The case had been filed during the term of the prior District Attorney 
who previously had gathered a group of senior prosecuting attorneys to decide the 
appropriateness of prosecuting the case. The case was filed and was in the stream of 
prosecution, one month prior to trial, when it was dismissed by Ms. Miller's own 
intervention. Ms. Miller was accused of dismissing the charges as part of a political 
payback for police backing her campaign for the head prosecutor position. Her action 
received a great deal of media attention for the dismissal and recorded the intense 
reaction to her decision. The attention was reviewed in both television and print 
coverage, letters to the editor of local newspapers and a letter from the former District 
Attorney responsible for filing the charges. R. 255-59 (containing copies of exhibits 
representative of the criticism leveled for the dismissal.) 
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The lynchpin to resolve the question presented in these cases is the appearance of 
impropriety which could, as indicated in defense counsel's letter to Ms. Miller, work a 
hardship to Mr. Balfour in the office's attempt to assure that he is not treated in any 
lenient or special fashion. The problem exists, however, that perhaps he should be 
treated leniently and or the case dismissed; but that will not happen because of the 
appearance that could be projected. Simple transfer of the case to another county 
attorney office would remedy the situation and permit the business of law to be transacted 
unencumbered by the prior business and current political relationships between the 
District Attorney and Mr. Balfour. 
In State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123,131 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated that 
a prosecutor should be disqualified when "[s]he has a personal conflicting interest in a 
case," yet the Court refused to reverse a conviction for failure to have disqualified a 
prosecutor because the issue was not raised until the direct appeal following the 
conviction. 
The Nickles Court ruled that if not raised until the appellate posture of the case, 
the defendant must prove actual prejudice. Id. The Court explained the issue in Nickles 
to be one of "apparent conflict" which there the Court rejected because of belated nature 
of raising the issue. The Court relied on an opinion from the Second Circuit where the 
Court of Appeals advocated a scaled approach to review prosecutorial conflict of interest 
claims. That court explained: 
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[T]he degree of prosecutorial misconduct... and the degree of prejudice to the 
defendant necessary to justify action by a reviewing court steadily increase as the 
case goes forward, with the least being required on a motion to disqualify, 
somewhat more on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment, still more on a 
motion in the district court after conviction but before appeal, [and] somewhat 
more on a direct appeal . . . . 
Wright v. United States, 782 F.2d 1048, 1056 n. 8, (2d Cir. 1984). 
Mr. Balfour's Motion to Disqualify, under this scaled approach, requires the least 
degree of prejudice as this Motion was raised early in the case. Mr. Balfour identified the 
apparent conflict supported by the past business and political relationship and the current 
ongoing relationship shared between the two as committee members on the County 
Republican Party's steering group. The trial court should have granted the motion to 
remove the impropriety and appearance of impropriety. 
Rule 1.11 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct address conflict relationships 
for government attorneys. Importantly, the rule focuses on the attorney representing or 
having represented a former client. Our scenario admittedly is distinct. Here we have 
Mr. Balfour as the provider of services and the District Attorney his former client. 
Arguably, the rule does not govern our situation because of the peculiarities, but again the 
discussions in the rule demonstrate the difficulty that the prior relationship works in this 
case and the need to disqualify the district attorney and the office. 
The exceptions to Rule 1.11 which allow the disqualification of the specific 
attorney but not the office are crafted to limit that attorney's involvement and remove any 
potential conflicts. Moreover, the Rule is crafted in a way that does not address the 
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controlling or managing attorney such as the district attorney, the elected official 
responsible to the public for the prosecution of offenses throughout the county. The Rule 
later addresses public officers and in that area is framed as a "shall not" and reads as 
follows (in pertinent part): 
(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public 
officer or employee: 
(d)(1) is subject to Rules 1.7 [Conflict of Interest: Current Clients], and 1.9 
[Duties to Former Clients]; and 
(d)(2) shall not: 
(d)(2)(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless 
the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in 
writing; [] 
(e) As used in this Rule, the term "matter" includes: 
(e)(1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other 
determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, 
arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; [] 
Rule 1.11, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
This Rule appears on its face to apply to our scenario, particularly subsection (e), 
but to the extent it may not, again it is simply good advice and practice to create and 
assist the public's confidence in the system and in avoiding the appearance of 
impropriety. 
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded, as requested by Mr. Balfour herein, to 
disqualify the whole office of the district attorney where a public defender who had 
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previously represented the defendant became the chief deputy of the district attorney 
prosecuting the accused. That court stated: 
We do not rest our decision only on the fact that the attorney involved here is the 
County Attorney's chief deputy; even if he were not, that office would have to 
divorce itself from the prosecution in this case, because even the appearance of 
unfairness cannot be permitted. What must a defendant and his family and friends 
think when his attorney leaves his case and goes to work in the very office that is 
prosecuting him? Even though there is no revelation by the attorney to his new 
colleagues, the defendant will never believe that. Justice and the law must rest 
upon the complete confidence of the thinking public and to do so they must avoid 
even the appearance of impropriety. Like Caesar's wife, they must be above 
reproach. As the Ethics Committee Opinion No. 235 put it: "Ordinarily knowledge 
or information held by any one member of the County Attorney's office is 
tantamount to knowledge of all such members, and that public confidence in our 
judicial system may be undermined if the appearance of evil, as well as the evil 
itself, is not avoided." 
State v. Latigue, 108 Ariz. 521, 502 P.2d 1340, 1341 (1972)(en banc). 
A final analogous situation is found in our rules of criminal procedure. Rule 18, 
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the jury selection process. Subsection (e) of 
that Rule controls the challenges for cause and expressly states circumstances which are 
presumptively prejudicial and create conflicts such that the potential juror cannot be 
qualified to sit as a juror in the case about to be heard. Subsection (e) reads, in pertinent 
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard 
and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be 
examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause 
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the 
court may remove a juror upon the same grounds. 
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(4) The existence of any social legal business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would 
be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. A 
prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to 
or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof. 
Rule 18(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
A strong argument exists that the district attorney could not sit as a juror in a case 
against Mr. Balfour due to the business and political relationship enjoyed between the 
two of them during the campaign. That acknowledgement begs the question whether the 
District Attorney and her office are justified in controlling the prosecution of Mr. 
Balfour. Both our Supreme Court and the jury selection rules committee agree with the 
practical result applicable to Mr. Balfour's case. The Court noted that greater care should 
be utilized in evaluating challenges for cause and legitimate doubts should be resolved in 
favor of removal. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995); Advisory Committee Note, 
Utah R.Crim. P. 18. This Court should exercise that same analysis and disqualify the 
district attorney and her office in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the lack of specific authority directly on point, Mr. Balfour urges the 
Court to find the remedy in his case to be as simple and straightforward to-wit: order the 
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disqualification of the District Attorney and her office from the prosecution of the case 
transferring the case to the offices of another county attorney. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO QUASH BINDOVER AND 
DISMISS COUNT IV 
CASE NO. 051900856 
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Quash and Dismiss Count IV, which were before 
the Court for hearing on December 20, 2006. The Defendant was present and represented by 
counsel, Benjamin A. Hamilton. The State was represented by Alicia H. Cook and Robert G. NeilL 
The Court has received and reviewed a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript, police reports 
concerning interviews with the four alleged victims, and transcripts of recorded interviews with the 
alleged victims. Having reviewed this evidence and considered the motions, memoranda and 
argument submitted by the parties, the Court enters the following: 
BACKGROUND 
The State has charged the Defendant with three counts of forcible sexual abuse and one 
count attempted forcible sexual abuse. The State presented evidence at a preliminary hearing 
1
 Both motions present legal questions. State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43, [^16 n.7, 143 
P.3d 268; State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^17, 70 P.3d 111. No testimony or other evidence 
was provided to the Court. As such, the Court need not make any factual findings. 
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before Judge Hilder on March 7, 2006. The magistrate bound the Defendant over on all counts. 
The Defendant has moved to quash the bindover. hi the alternative, he asks the Court to 
remand for a new preliminary hearing, specifically arguing that the Utah Court o f Appeals's 
recent decision in State v. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356,144 P.3d 226, requires the magistrate to 
consider whether the conduct complained of under the "indecent liberties" prong of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-404 was equally offensive to skin-to-skin contact. The Defendant also moves to 
dismiss Count IV as unconstitutionally vague. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant is not entitled to a new preliminary hearing because the State has not 
filed any new or additional charges. The State is proceeding on the same offenses that were 
charged in the original Information and that were the subject of the March 7, 2006 preliminary 
hearing. The recent interpretation by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Jacobs of "touching" 
as contained in the Forcible Sexual Abuse statute did not change the elements of Forcible Sexual 
Abuse and does not change the evidence that the State will proceed on. Although the Jacobs 
decision may force the State to narrow its approach in the case to the "otherwise takes indecent 
liberties" language of the statute, the Defendant is not entitled to a new preliminary hearing. It is 
an inherent possibility in any crimmal prosecution that the State's approach to a case will shift or 
change between preliminary hearing and trial as witnesses' testimony evolves or as evidence 
develops. The mere fact that such a change or shift occurs does not entitle a defendant to a new 
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preliminary hearing unless the defendant is faced with new or additional charges, hi this case, 
the State has not changed the offenses charged against the Defendant and plans on proceeding on 
the same information that was presented at the preliminary hearing. 
2. The Defendant has argued that he should be granted a new preliminary hearing 
because, in light of State v. Jacobs, his cross examination would be different. The right to 
confrontation, however, is a trial right, and the Defendant is not entitled to a new preliminary 
hearing for the purpose of re-opening cross-examination. The purpose of a preliminary hearing is 
to establish probable cause to believe that the individual charged has committed the alleged 
offenses, and that purpose has been fulfilled in the instant case. A lengthy preliminary hearing 
was conducted on March 7, 2006, concerning the same Information and charges that the 
Defendant currently faces, and counsel for the Defendant cross-examined each witness called by 
the State. The Defendant has therefore received every process that is due to him at a preliminary 
hearing stage. 
3. The Defendant also argues that the bindover should be quashed because the State 
presented insufficient evidence. At the preliminary hearing, however, the State presented 
evidence that three of the alleged victims were touched by the Defendant in private areas of their 
bodies, despite their repeated protests and resistance, while isolated with the Defenant in the 
context of a business meeting. The fourth alleged victim testified that the Defendant removed 
her jacket, fulled her toward him, and lifted her shirt enough to expose her bra. hi light of the 
low burden of proof at a preliminary hearing and the instruction to reviewing courts to examine 
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Court concludes that the State presented 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the Defendant's conduct was of 
equal gravity to a skin-to-skin touching, and the case was properly bound over. 
4. The Court also concludes that the "indecent liberties" prong of the Forcible Sexual 
Abuse statute is both facially constitutional and constitutional as applied to the Defendant. This 
language has been defined as proscribing conduct that rises to the same magnitude as touching 
protected body parts. The Defendant is therefore adequately put on notice of what conduct is 
illegal, including his alleged attempt to commit Forcible Sexual Abuse against Ms. Gibbons. 
ORDER 
The Defendant's motion to quash the bindover or grant a new preliminary hearing is 
denied. The Defendant's motion to dismiss Count IV is also denied. 
DATED this Vt day of October, 2007. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SEVER COUNTS 
CASE NO. 051900856 
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts, which was before the Com! for 
hearing on November 1, 2006. The Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Benjamin 
A. Hamilton. The State was represented by Alicia H. Cook and Robert G. Neill. The Court has 
received and reviewed a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript and Defendant's Addendum to 
Motion to Sever, which included police reports concerning interviews with the four alleged victims, 
and transcripts of recorded interviews with the alleged victims. Having reviewed this evidence and 
considered the motions, memoranda and argument submitted by the parties, the Court enters the 
following: 
BACKGROUND1 
The State has charged the Defendant with three counts of forcible sexual abuse and one 
1
 A motion to sever requires the Court to scrupulously examine the 404(b) evidence in 
the proper exercise of the Court's discretion. See State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, [^15, 108 P.3d 
730. Although the Court weighs proffered evidence, it does not make factual or credibility 
determinations. As such, the Court need not enter any findings of fact. 
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count attempted forcible sexual abuse. The State presented evidence at a preliminary hearing 
before Judge Hilder on March 7, 2006. The magistrate bound the Defendant over on all counts. 
The Defendant has moved to sever the Counts. The four counts are based on allegations 
by four different women, but have been filed together in a single Information. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court begins its analysis under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) to determine 
whether evidence o the various counts would be admissible at a separate trial for each of the 
counts individually if the counts were tried separately. 
2. The three counts involving Michelle Lawrence, Rachelle Olson, and Rebecca Gibbons 
fall directly within the ambit of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), which is an inclusionary rule. 
Evidence concerning the other alleged victims would properly be admitted for the non-character 
purpose of showing Defendant's intent, and lack of consent by the alleged victims. 
3. Evidence concerning the other alleged victims would also be relevant at a separate 
trial for one alleged victim. The State bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the Defendant acted intentionally and knowingly, that he also acted with the specific intent to 
sexually arouse or gratify himself, and that he acted without the consent of the alleged victims. 
The circumstances surrounding each of the counts tend to demonstrate that Defendant possessed 
the requisite intent, and that the alleged victims did not consent. The fact that the Defendant 
repeated his conduct with more than one woman under similar circumstances, if true, indicates 
that he acted intentionally and knowingly. The facts that Defendant touched or attempted to 
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touch private body parts and made suggestive comments or manipulated the clothing of the 
alleged victims, if true, indicates that he was acting with the specific intent to arouse his own 
sexual desire. Finally, the circumstances of all of the incidents, that the alleged victims believed 
they were interacting with Defendant in a professional context, indicates that they did not consent 
to his alleged conduct. 
4. There are significant similarities among the three counts. All three of the counts arose 
out of a business situation in which the Defendant allegedly attempted to induce young women to 
come to his business to audition or take advantage of some other opportunity, whether that 
attempt was through a newspaper advertisement, word-of-mouth, or the Defendant himself 
approaching a woman to create an interest in an opportunity related to his business. The 
Defendant also allegedly isolated himself with each alleged victim when the conduct occurred. 
The Defendant's conduct with each alleged victim involved protected body parts. These three 
counts also occurred within a twenty-four hour time period. 
5. The proximity of time and similarity in circumstances of these counts renders them 
very probative. 
6. The Defendant has pointed to inconsistencies in the alleged victims' statements. 
However, any inconsistencies between the alleged victims' statements to the police and their 
testimony at the preliminary hearing do not fall under any of the criteria that the Court must 
examine under Rule 404(b). 
7. The Defendant has also argued that a 404(b) motion should be denied because he 
would be prejudiced by a presentation of evidence in the aggregate. Rule 404(b), however, does 
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not prohibit the presentation of evidence merely because there is a large quantity of it. Rather, 
the Court is required to examine very specific criteria under Rule 404(b), including whether the 
evidence would be admitted for a proper, non-character purpose. As stated previously, the 
evidence would be admitted for the proper purpose of demonstrating the Defendant's intent, and 
the Defendant has acknowledged that the State seeks to use this evidence to demonstrate his 
intent to commit the charged conduct. Furthermore, the standard under Rule 404(b) is not merely 
whether the evidence is prejudicial to the defendant, but whether there is a risk that unfair 
prejudice will substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. The Court finds that 
because the charged conduct is very similar in time, in frame, and in circumstances, it is very 
probative as to the elements that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
therefore any prejudice to Defendant is outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. 
8. The Court is also required to examine the evidence to determine whether it is likely to 
cause the triers of fact to be unable to master their hostility toward the Defendant, or in other 
words, whether the evidence is so shocking that the triers of fact would not be able to overcome 
their feelings about an individual who would commit those types of egregious acts. The evidence 
in this case involves the touching of protected body parts. It does not involve allegations of more 
intrusive conduct, such as rape or forcible sodomy. The Court finds that the charged conduct 
does not rise to the level where a jury would be unable to be fair simply because the evidence 
comes from a number of different witnesses is not supported by the law. 
9. The Count involving Danielle Jenson would also be admissible at a separate trial. The 
Court considers this Count separately because it is not as close in time as the other three counts, 
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but determines that it is admissible because it meets the remaining criteria. Similar to the other 
three counts, Ms. Jenson's testimony would be admitted for the proper purpose of showing lack 
of consent and the Defendant's intent, would be relevant for demonstrating those elements, and is 
similar in circumstances to the other three counts. Although the count involving Ms. Jenson 
occurred sixteen months prior to the other counts, it is not so removed in time that it would be 
unfair to admit it, and the other criteria required under Rule 404(b) weigh in favor of admission. 
10. Under the statute governing joinder, the Court is required to seer counts if it finds 
that joinder causes prejudice to either the Defendant or the prosecution. While this analysis of 
prejudice is different than what is required under Rule 404(b), the Court must use its 404(b) 
ruling in determining whether the Defendant would be prejudiced. Under the prejudice analysis 
required by the joinder statute, the Defendant's argument that he will be prejudiced by a 
presentation of evidence in the aggregate may be merited, but the Court has already determined 
that the State would be allowed to present evidence of the other victims under Rule 404(b) if the 
counts were severed. Therefore, the question before the Court is whether the Defendant will 
suffer any actual prejudice by joining the counts. The Court concludes that because the evidence 
is otherwise admissible and presumably would be presented at separate trials, no prejudice results 
from simply having one jury weigh the testimony and make a determination as to each count, as 
opposed to having four different juries hear the same evidence and make a determine on one 
count. 
11. The Court also concludes that the four Counts are properly joined in one Information 
because they are part of a common scheme or plan. The Court's prior 404(b) analysis is also 
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applicable to its detemiination that the four counts are sufficiently connected by factual similarity 
or proximity in time to constitute scheme or plan. 
ORDER 
The Defendant's motion to Sever Counts is denied. The State may proceed to trial on the 
single information charging offenses involving Danielle Jenson, Michelle Lawrence, Rachael 
Olson, and Rebecca Gibbons. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Regarding Defendant's 
Motion to Disqualify District 
Attorney's Office 
Case No. 051900856 
Defendant. Judge JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
This matter came before the Court on Tuesday, September 25th, 2007, for a 
hearing regarding the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office. The Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Benjamin A. 
Hamilton. The State was represented by Alicia H. Cook. The Court has received and 
reviewed Defendant's Motion to Disqualify, the State's Motion in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion, and Defendant's Reply to the State's Motion in Opposition. The 
Court has also heard argument from both parties concerning the motion. 
Having fully considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and for good 
cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendant Balfour's contribution of media support to District Attorney Lohra 
Miller's campaign and current involvement in the Republican Party do not create a 
conflict of interest such that disqualification of the entire Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office is necessary. 
ORDER 
Defendant Balfour's motion to disqualify the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office is denied. 
Dated this xy day of October, 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
Counsel for Defendant 
ADDENDUM D 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ALICIA H. COOK, 8851 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 












Assigned to: A. Cook (Thursday) 
DAO # 05002644 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
CaseNo.051900856FS 
The undersigned Deputy District Attorney under oath states on information and belief 
that the defendant committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, a Second Degree Felony, at 340 West Whitney Avenue, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 21, 2005, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
OZWALD BALFOUR, a party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks, or any part of 
the genitals of another, or touched the breasts of a female person 14 years of age or older, 
QT otherwise took indecent liberties with another, or caused another to take indecent 
liberties with the actor or another, with the intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily 
pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of any person, 
without the consent of the other, regardless of the sex of any participant. 
Thl ! ! iW C T C 0 «"»T 
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FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, a Second Degree Felony, at 340 West Whitney Avenue, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 21, 2005, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
OZWALD BALFOUR, a party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks, or any part of 
the genitals of another, or touched the breasts of a female person 14 years of age or older, 
or otherwise took indecent liberties with another, or caused another to take indecent 
liberties with the actor or another, with the intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily 
pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of any person, 
without the consent of the other, regardless of the sex of any participant. 
COUNT III 
FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, a Second Degree Felony, at 1375 West 7000 South #13, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 15, 2003, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in thai the defendant, 
OZWALD BALFOUR, a party to the offense, touched the anus, buttocks, or any part of 
the genitals of another, or touched the breasts of a female person 14 years of age or older, 
or otherwise took indecent liberties with another, or caused another to take indecent 
liberties with the actor or another, with the intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily 
pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of any person, 
without the consent of the other, regardless of the sex of any participant. 
COUNT IV 
ATTEMPTED FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, a Third Degree Felony, at 340 West Whitney 
Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 21, 2005, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, OZWALD BALFOUR, a party to the offense, attempted to touch the anus, 
buttocks, or any part of the genitals of another, or touched the breasts of a female person 
14 years of age or older, or otherwise took indecent liberties with another, or caused 
another to take indecent liberties with the actor or another, with the intent to cause 
substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify 
the sexual desires of any person, without the consent of the other, regardless of the sex of 
any participant. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 




PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases probable cause on the following: 
1. That statement of j^ichelle Lawrence^ that she met the defendant, Ozwald Balfour, 
through a friend, and was offered an opportunity to interview for possible employment with the 
defendant's company, Media Entertainment Studio. On January 21st, 2005, Ms. Lawrence went 
to the defendant's place of business, located at 340 West Whitney Avenue in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. The defendant invited Ms. Lawrence into his office and closed the door. The defendant 
touched Ms. Lawrence's breasts and attempted to remove her shirt. The defendant also placed 
Ms. Lawrence's hand on his crotch. Ms. Lawrence repeatedly told the defendant "no" and was 
eventually able to leave the office. 
2. The statement ftf Rachael Qljpi>that she is acquainted with Michelle Lawrence. On 
January 21st, 2005, Ms. Olson accompanied Ms. Lawrence to Media Entertainment Studio. The 
defendant invited Ms. Olson into a room adjacent to his office. The defendant touched Ms. 
Olson's breasts and buttocks. Ms. Olson repeatedly told the defendant "no" and pushed the 
defendant away. 
3. The statement of^^eccaJGiyais^ftiat on January 21st, 2005, she was shopping at a Wal-
Mart located near the defendant's business when the defendant approached her and asked her if 
she would be interested in appearing in a children's movie. The defendant invited Ms. Givens to 
his office at Media Entertainment Studio, where he grabbed Ms. Givens by the hips and 




4. The statement o£panielle Jensoi^that on September 15th, 2003, the defendant came to her 
residence, located at 1375 West 7000 South in Salt Lake County, Utah, to discuss financial aid 
for acting classes. The defendant put his hand underneath Ms. Jenson's shirt and touched her 
breastr^Ms. Jenson tried to push the defendant away. The defendant put his hand down Ms. 




Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3 / 
day of April, 2005. 
MAGISTRATE 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
'J/iO** ft- Cc^i 
rfepiiW District Attorney 
February 8,2005 
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